The need for discussion of the question of the structure of ethics, its interrelation with other disciplines, methods of ethics research and, finally, ways of achieving a connection between ethical theory and practice has undoubtedly become urgent.

The characteristics of moral consciousness are usually examined jointly with normative and value factors. O. G. Drobnitskii justly considers the leading criterion of moral consciousness to be the normative quality of moral judgments, the distinctive characteristic of which consists, in turn, of the impersonal nature of such judgments, and also of the fact that moral consciousness "does not associate its judgments directly to whatever facts may be at hand" . Without entering into a polemic against these assertions, we should like (...) to proceed to deal with a different aspect of the same question. (shrink)

Good and evil are the most general ethical categories from which we can get our bearings in the fundamental philosophical and normative problems of ethics. In the contemporary scholarly literature the interpretation of the good is multifunctional. Good is regarded as a model of morality, as the most general moral requirement or most general moral evaluation, and finally as a practical norm, i.e., a requirement embodied in moral experience, as a unity of the objective and subjective in moral actions. The (...) history of ethical thought was bound to reach this broad, all-embracing conception of the good, indeed, that was the way it went, mastering the content of the category of the good, bit by bit, focusing attention now on one, now on another of its aspects. Hence the most general explanation of the good as a synonym for morality has not at all been the same throughout the different stages in the history of ethical thought. Good, like evil, and like all other ethical categories, had a different compass and different sets of attributes in diverse ethical systems. One must also consider that until modern times, there had never existed a single categorial term to designate morality as a whole. As O. G. Drobnitskii noted, the words "good and evil," "justice," "virtue," and "manners" were often preferred to the concept "morals"; and moreover, each of these words was used to designate not only the particular phenomena within moral philosophy but the entire domain of morals in general. (shrink)

The proper development of Marxist-Leninist ethics demands thorough analysis of its categories, and clarification of their nature and interconnections. These questions are still inadequately treated in our philosophical literature. The problem of the essence of ethical categories is actually bypassed, yet it is precisely here that one finds many disputes and much that is not clear. This problem requires the solution of questions such as the relationship between existing morality and ethical theory, between actual moral feelings, views and principles on (...) the one hand, and ethical categories on the other. In this article let us focus attention on these questions. (shrink)

There are some arguments supporting the pessimistic meta-induction, coming from the direction of quantum theory (A. Kukla and J. Walmsley), from the direction of Laudan’s list with successful but false theories, and from the specific direction of the phlogiston theory (whom Kukla Walmsley, and S. Psillos consider to be false). Against these arguments we believe we can successfully oppose, in the first case the interactive quantum realism of I. Niiniluoto, in the second case the realism of the theoretical theoretical constituents (...) responsible for the empirical success of the theories of S. Psillos, and in the third case the analysis of the phlogiston theory done by V. Verronen, R. Vihalemm and E. McMullin (who suggested that this theory was simultaneously insufficiently mature and approximately true). Our conclusion does not necessary prove that the perspective of the scientific realism is true, but rather that the pessimistic meta-induction attack against it proves to be unconvincing. (shrink)

A commitment to receive input from stakeholders is often obligatory in the crafting of environmental policies. This requirement is presumed to satisfy certain conditions of democracy. In this article, by drawing from pragmatism, we examine the logic of participation and prerequisites of the meaningful game of asking for and giving reasons. We elaborate the nature and significance of three components—the game, the pleadings, and the reasons. We conclude by offering the conditions under which the stakeholder game might be considered legitimate.

This comprehensive and up-to-date textbook gives a clear account of the different philosophical and theoretical approaches to psychology and discusses major philosophical questions such as free will and the relation between mind and body.

В работе сделана попытка рассмотреть с позиции библейской, святоотеческой и научной антропологии общие аспекты психической жизни человека. Работа адресована широкому кругу читателей.

Trait Selective Abortions (TSA) have come under critique as a medical practice that presents potential disabled infants as burdens and lacking the potential for meaningful lives. This paper, using the author’s background as a disabled person, contends that the philosophy underpinning TSAs reflects liberal society’s lack of a theory of needs. The author argues for a care ethics based approach informed by disability analyses to engage with TSAs.

This study intends to show that the question whether faith can be justified without proofs can be resolved by importing ideas from Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s affirmative take on the matter. There is a deep similarity between the way they understand belief in God and belief in Christianity: for both the first is considered universal human knowledge and the second seen as a gift from God. Against the charge that such an understanding is irrational Plantinga offers an externalist epistemological model which (...) allows those beliefs to be warranted. The authors also share the modern idea that there is an objective truth, combining it with the postmodern stance that no method exists which would guarantee access to it. A specific contribution on Kierkegaard’s part to the understanding of the rationality of transitions toward a Christian stage of existence is to show in detail the way in which such transitions are mediated through inwardnes - a perspective akin to Michael Polanyi’s scientific epistemology. One can see in both authors not only a deep commonality of ideas, but also a remarkable way in which their understandings augment each other. Whereas Plantinga’s inquiry contributes to the rational plausibility of a “Justified Faith without Reasons” project, Kierkegaard’s venture balances such a logical-analytic effort with a deep existential inquiry. (shrink)

В монографии рассматривается влияние философии Платона на русскую философию и культуру в целом. Для студентов, аспирантов, преподавателей гуманитарного направления, специалистов в области истории русской философии, философии культуры, педагогики.

В монографии рассматриваются различные аспекты проявления философии Платона в русской культуре. Существенное значение имеет уточнение в названии монографии - это очерки русской философской мысли. Для тех, кому небезразлична судьба истории русской философии.

Crosslinguistically, the same modal words can be used to express a wide range of interpretations. This crosslinguistic trend supports a Kratzerian analysis, where each modal has a core lexical entry and where the difference between an epistemic and a root interpretation is contextually determined. A long-standing problem for such a unified account is the equally robust crosslinguistic correlation between a modal’s interpretation and its syntactic behavior: epistemics scope high (in particular higher than tense and aspect) and roots low, a fact (...) which has led to proposals that hardwire different syntactic positions for epistemics and roots (cf. Cinque’s hierarchy). This paper argues that the range of interpretations a modal receives is even more restricted: a modal must be keyed to certain time-individual pairs, but not others. I show that this can be captured straightforwardly by minimally modifying the Kratzerian account: modals are relative to an event—rather than a world—of evaluation, which readily provides a time (the event’s running time) and (an) individual(s) (the event’s participants). I propose that this event relativity of modals can in turn explain the correlation between type of interpretation and syntactic position, without stipulation of an interpretation-specific height for modals. (shrink)